THE HAWAI'I NISEI STORY
Americans of Japanese Ancestry During WWII

On the evening of December 6, 1941, Heza Mikami had been listening to Japan's station JOAK over his short-wave radio set. After the last program signed off the air at about midnight, Mikami told his family that he had just heard something disturbing. The radio announcer had ended his program with a comment in Japanese that said. "Whatever happens in the Pacific, it is not our responsibility." "Gee, that's a funny thing to say," his daughter Kay remembers him saying.

The next morning, Japan bombed Pearl Harbor. By 5:30 that afternoon, two men in military uniforms and one man in a plainclothes suit came to pick Heza Mikami up. He was brought to the immigration station where, he later told his daughter, the Hawaii Japanese detainees were "packed like sardines." Some other Japanese men had not been given a chance to change their clothes, were whisked away from their homes on sight and left standing at the station in just their pajamas and yukatas. Mikami was interned from December 7, 1941 until November, 1945.

On that Sunday morning of December 7, Tomomichi Kuraishi was having a breakfast of coffee and toast when he heard a "vroom." It was about 8 o'clock then, and the "ground-shaking kind" sound was cause for concern. So Kuraishi turned on his radio and turned in to KGMB. To his surprise, the tinkling strains of ukulele music poured forth. "Ho! So peaceful! How come? I thought emergency announcement you know. I expected police or something; but 'pinko. . . pinko. . . pinko.' What that?" Then Kuraishi's cousin-in-law, who lived next door and had gone fishing on the peninsula near Pearl City the night before, came running in. From where he had been situated, Ford Island and Battleship Row in Pearl Harbor could be clearly seen. That morning as he was fishing, a black Japanese plane with the mark of the rising sun, the distinct big red ball, flew past. The surprise bombing raid on Pearl Harbor had begun, and now the fisherman was running back to warn his neighbors. "War! War! War!" he screamed. But as Kuraishi continued to listen, "Still radio say, 'Pinko. . . pinko. . . pinko' . . . ukulele music!"

After awhile a bulletin finally was announced. "War has come, and this is not a practice." At about 9 o'clock, a call for all Pearl Harbor workers to report to the base's main gate came over the radio. Kuraishi had been hired by a construction company for work on a building in Pearl Harbor, so he quickly responded to the announcement and jumped aboard the Oahu Railway at Iwilei along with other workers. He realized then that except for himself and a nisei carpenter, the passengers on the train were all Haoles. Japanese were not usually allowed into Pearl Harbor at the time, unless they had been hired by a private company to work on a building.

As the workers arrived at the main gate, smoke was filling the sky in the near distance, though none of the actual battle could be seen. In the confusion that prevailed, Kuraishi and some others were routed in a dump trunk towards the Harbor's channel. There, a Japanese midget submarine had been captured and the drowned bodies of its two commanders retrieved. The bodies were carted in a wheelbarrow over the wharf and, for some unknown reason, dumped in front of Kuraishi. Then an American naval officer attended to the bodies, so Kuraishi and the others in the truck drove on to the non-com housing where a Japanese plane had been shot down and the bodies of its two pilots lay burned. "No arms, no legs-only torso. All dark, chicken roast color. Burned," Kuraishi remembers. Outside of these grisly vestiges of war, the place was peaceful. "I didn't see any officers, families or nobody. Really! I wonder, 'Where the war?'" Kuraishi was later interned at Honouliuli in 1944.

At about the time Kuraishi heard the call for Pearl Harbor workers, Take Okawa (Beekman) was leading a Sunday class in song at the Chuo Gakuen in downtown Honolulu, the first Japanese language school on Oahu.

Outside, the sky was a bright morning blue that Take remembers being marred at one instance by an damaged plane still flying but trailing smoke. Explosions were coming from the direction of Pearl Harbor and the ground trembled with each boom. The children had finished singing the school's song and were into the second verse of the Bunny Dance when anti-aircraft shells exploded across the street and in the schoolyard. Shrapnel flew into the auditorium and confusion ensued. One young girl was killed and a boy whose wrist had been pierced had his hand amputated later. A child who ran to his home two blocks away from the school was struck down and killed also by the falling anti-aircraft rounds. There were about 40 explosions in Honolulu during the attack on Pearl Harbor. All, except one, were the result of U.S. anti-aircraft fire. The surprise of the bombing attack so rattled the gunners at defense positions that they often neglected to fix the fuses of the anti-aircraft shells they were shooting.

By 11 a.m., the school gates of the Chuo Gakuen were closed for security. Suddenly Take heard somebody shouting, "Open the gates! Open up! We're from the FBI!" As she opened the gates, she faced two men, one in a black suit with a .45 caliber pistol and the other carrying a revolver. She began to explain what had just occurred when another shell exploded nearby. "Those two men, scared as anything, shouted, 'Get out! 'Get out! By all means, get out!' And they didn't wait for me, they just scrammed!" she recalls. The doors of the Chuo Gakuen never opened again.

The attack on Pearl Harbor began at 7:55 a.m., December 7, 1941. In the next two hours, 18 out of 96 ships in the harbor were sunk or seriously damaged. Airfields and Marine bases on Oahu were also targeted. Some 394 planes made up the U.S. air strength, but many were obsolete or being repaired. Of these, 188 planes were destroyed, 96 Army and 92 Navy. American casualties were logged in: Navy - 2008 killed, 710 wounded; Marines - 109 killed, 69 wounded; Army - 218 killed, 364 wounded; civilian - 68 killed, 35 wounded. Of the total 2,403 killed, nearly half were lost when the battleship Arizona sank.

The Japanese Striking Force, consisting of 31 ships and 432 planes, lost only 29 planes. The Japanese Advance Expeditionary Force of about 28 submarines, 11 with small planes and 5 with midget subs, lost one large submarine and all 5 midgets. All told, 55 airmen, nine crewmen of the midget subs, plus an unknown number on the larger submarine were lost.

The Japanese bombs that dropped on Oahu, December 7, 1941, did more than just wreck military havoc on the tiny Hawaiian island. Calling the assaults "infamous treachery," U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt declared war on Japan the following day. In Hawaii, martial law was declared within 24 hours of the attack, and Lt. General Walter C. Short, commander of the U.S. Army in Hawaii was proclaimed military governor of the Hawaiian territory. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was suspended and operations of civil and criminal courts were assumed by the Army along with the regulation of labor and wage rates, food production and supply, the press, commerce, public health and all other territorial and city functions. The foundations of the territory's lifestyle crumbled as its social, political, cultural and economic structure was altered and the rights of its people remained in traction for three years until October 24, 1944.

The Japanese assault on Oahu, in addition, served to fan the flames of racial prejudice that had been brewing in the nation. In 1940, over 127,000 people of Japanese ancestry were in the continental U.S. and 160,000 in the territory of Hawaii. International agreements and national and state legislation and measures had attempted to discourage and restrict Japanese immigration over the years and control the immigrant's agricultural, industrial and economic development. In some cases they were regarded as formidable competitors and a threat to the economic status quo of the communities around them. December 7 and the ensuing public hysteria

In Hawaii, where the Japanese constituted 37.3 percent of the territorial population and the largest ethnic group in 1940 U.S. Census statistics, the threat to the islands' social and economic security grew more ominous. When martial law was declared, kamaaina Haole leaders were appointed to key positions in the military empire. Walter Dillingham became the director of food production and Lorrin P. Thurston, then president and general manager of the Honolulu Advertiser was appointed to the position of public relations adviser to the military governor. Propaganda in support of the military regime was promoted through the Advertiser even after the U.S. Supreme court had declared the military rule in Hawaii unconstitutional.

The attitude of distrust in the Japanese in Hawaii pervaded the ranks of the military lawmakers. As U.S. Attorney for the district of Hawaii, Angus Taylor Jr. had the duty of deciding whether or not certain criminal prosecutions were to be instituted within Hawaii. He was also legal advisor to the executive office of the military governor. In the Roberts Commission proceedings on January 6, 1942 investigating the December 7, 1941 Pearl Harbor attack, he testified, "The Japanese block here is a very powerful one, and they have been careful enough in keeping it toned down. If this territory were a state they would immediately step forward, and they could then control the local legislature or they could elect the governor, either a puppet or one of their own kind, or they could send to Congress Japanese or else men whom they could control . . . Another point that affects the economic life of this territory is the tremendous control in that there is no room for a competitor, and they must conform or they will be ruined and have the whole thing smashed, and they could even establish their own insurance company. They own factor houses something like the Big Five, and they have the association, and they control many things; they control distribution." When questioned on his attitude towards the local Japanese, should there be any Japanese victories or threat of invasion by the Japanese on Oahu, Taylor replied, "I think, Mr. Justice, that there is no doubt that majority of the younger Japanese of the third generation or American citizens will immediately turn over to their own race . . . they would go over to the other side."

Concerned with the internal security of the Hawaiian Islands, the U.S. Army and Navy began intelligence investigations several years before 1941. Japanese agencies in Hawaii and people of Japanese ancestry who were suspicious in the military's judgment and should be interned in the event of hostilities between Japan and the U.S. were investigated. In August, 1939, the Federal Bureau of Investigation opened up an office in Hawaii to assume intelligence investigations on civilian espionage, sabotage and subversive activities. Lists of names which had been collected by the military were then turned over to the FBI though the Navy agreed to continue its civilian intelligence work until the new investigative agency was able to take over on its own. At that time, the FBI did not have a Japanese translator or access to the Japanese community. By December 7, 1941, however, it had grown to a staff of about 25 including one Japanese language translator of Japanese ancestry. The Navy also had an agent of Japanese ancestry serving as a translator and interpretor in their intelligence work. The Army had an "A" list of about 700 individuals who were to be interned in the event of hostilities with Japan and a "B" list of some 1,000 persons who were to be kept under surveillance in the event of war with Japan. Both of these lists were turned over to the FBI.

Beginning with that groundwork, FBI investigations then pursued background knowledge of these individuals and the Japanese community as a whole. In testimony before the Roberts Commission on January 6, 1942, Robert L. Shivers, special agent charge of the FBI in Hawaii, explained, "We then saw that we did not have sufficient background knowledge of the Japanese, so we then began what we call a Japanese survey of the entire islands. That took into consideration all of the Japanese societies, the control of the Japanese Consulate over the various societies, the control of the Japanese Consulate Over the alien Japanese."

The FBI soon learned that about 234 Japanese consular agents had been appointed by the Consul General of Japan in Hawaii. They were scattered throughout the Hawaiian Islands and thus regarded by the military and FBI as a potential threat to security. "If used as an espionage ring they would be in a position to furnish the consulate with espionage information from every corner of the Hawaiian Islands," Shivers explained at the commission hearing.

In 1940, Shivers submitted the 1st of Japanese acting as consular agents in Hawaii to the director of the FBI in Washington and questioned whether these consular agents who had not registered had violated the Registration Act and could be prosecuted. He justified his proposal with: "While this office is not aware of the full extent of the duties of the consular agents, it is believed that they are required to look after the interests of the Japanese populace in their respective communities, to keep alive the Japanese spirit, and to do the bidding of the Japanese Consulate. They are undoubtedly looked upon by the Japanese populace as representatives of the Japanese Consulate and the Japanese government and the Emperor of Japan, and for that reason wield considerable influence in determining the actions and molding the thought of the Japanese populace in Hawaii, especially among the alien element . . .”

The situation was forwarded to the State Department which did not object to the prosecutions, but the Department of War on the recommendation of Commanding General Walter Short, suggested that a warning, instead of a prosecution, be issued to the unregistered Japanese consular agents to register by a certain date, under penalty of prosecution for violation of the law. General Short had earlier recommended this measure in view of the counter-propaganda campaign the Army had initiated which promised fair treatment to encourage loyalty of the Japanese population in Hawaii and discourage sabotage and espionage.

The consular agents were particularly suspect in view of their duties. According to Shiver, they had been quite prominent in collecting comfort kits, moneys and funds for transmittal to Japan, had been leaders in the Japanese community, had filled out all of the papers necessary for aliens to transmit to the consul, and assisted dual citizens. They also handled expatriation matters and assisted in the Japanese commercial census which was taken in Hawaii about every five years under orders of the Japanese government.

Shivers also indicated that the identities of these agents were learned when the local Japanese paper Nippu Jiji had published the names and address of all Japanese consular agents prior to 1941. When the Japanese consul realized investigations were being conducted on the consular agents, their names were omitted from the directories printed in 1941 and thereafter.

The FBI's view of "dangerous" element in the community extended to other institutions. Shivers elaborated in his testimony: "I would say off hand that the (Japanese) language newspapers, the Hotel Association, the Japanese language schools have been the worst subversive elements in Hawaii. Definitely the language school has prevented the assimilation of the American way of life on the part of the Japanese . . . . Fifty-one percent of the teachers in the Japanese language schools are alien. Forty-nine percent are American. The Shinto priest are all very definitely dangerous. All of them, Shinto priest, are now in custodial detention. There are two sects, the church and state sects, of Shintoism . . . . All state Shinto priests some time ago, about a year ago, were raised by the Japanese government to a position equal to military officers, and we felt that that of itself was sufficient justification for their internment in the event of hostilities." By interning these elements in the event of war, Shivers felt that the leadership of the Japanese community would then be eliminated.

During the proceedings of the Roberts Commission, Shivers presented FBI charts which diagrammed the operational flow of various Japanese organizations, including the names of persons in key positions within the groups. The charts also portrayed the network of activity between various Japanese organizations and Japan, and among Japanese organizations in Hawaii. The entire territory of Hawaii had been surveyed and the results charted: 1) Racial composition of the territory of Hawaii, 2) Japanese activities in the territory of Hawaii, 3) The Japanese consular organization in Hawaii, 4) Japanese language schools in Hawaii, 4) the United Japanese Society of Honolulu, 5) Foreign controlled Japanese corporations, 6) Alien Japanese controlled corporations in Hawaii, 7) the Honpa Hongwanji organization in the territory of Hawaii, 8) the Judo-shu organization in the territory of Hawaii, and 9) the Overseas Japanese Central Society. Also included were charts of the operational structure and key names to Communist, German, and Italian activities in the territory of Hawaii.

To learn more about the individuals who were judged as being potential security threats or menaces in the event of war, the intelligence agencies established contacts within the Japanese communities who would supplement their knowledge of the local Japanese society. Reverend Masao Yamada disclosed his role in these activities on Kauai. About six months before the attack on Pearl Harbor, a military intelligence officer approached Police Chief Edwin Crowell of Waimea, Kauai, to seek an individual who was trustworthy, unbiased and in a position to know the ongoings of the Japanese community. Yamada was a good friend of Crowell and had managed some of his political affairs. He was also a pastor at the Hanapepe Christian Church and a secretary for the Lions Club, so Crowell recommended him. The major then approached Yamada and asked for assistance in the intelligence work.

According to Yamada, their meetings and activities were kept secret. "We couldn't tell who was running this (operation), or what was happening. We were told not to say anything." He was informed that Japan might attack Pearl Harbor and that the military intelligence was thus seeking information on individuals who might be detained in the event of war because of their questionable national sympathies. A list had already been compiled of people who were under suspicion or had any relations with Japan. Once a month when the major would arrive dressed in plain civilian clothes, they would discuss some of the individuals listed along with the general pulse of the small Hanapepe community. The major would ask questions and Yamada would answer.

At no time, Yamada says, did he submit names to the authorities. In some cases, he explained the circumstances individuals were in for which they were being judged as questionable. "They gave me a list, for example, of those connected with the Japanese consulate, and I knew practically all of them in my district. I told them this man is a good man, he works for the consulate because he can read and write where the other Japanese old folks couldn't. They knew what to do. It wasn't that he was loyal to Japan, it was a case of necessity. They could write letters, they did service work and all the things a consulate could do."

Many of the persons who were blacklisted were whisked off to internment camps before Yamada knew of it. In one instance, however, he was able to speak up for a internee and instead of being sent to the Mainland, the individual was kept on Kauai, though still as a prisoner.

Yamada eventually became a liaison for the internees and their families, transporting clothing and parcels to the camps and comforting families and others left behind. Names and reports of suspicious behavior were still being sought by the intelligence after December 7. Over 3,000 names of suspicious Japanese were reported after the blitz on Pearl Harbor, but not a single report was made by a Japanese. One puzzled authority questioned Yamada who retorted, "When you intern citizens without any adequate reason, all of us fear that it will happen to us some day. Knowing that it can happen, the sensible thing would be to keep quiet and live a meaningful life while it lasted. Being an American citizen now has no meaning in the eyes of the authorities. Nobody would have the heart to report any Japanese under such conditions for every Japanese is discredited to begin with."

Regardless of the FBI's report of the 3,000 names, Shivers testified that a few niseis were supplying the authorities with information, "and even since the outbreak of hostilities they have supplied us with names of alien Japanese who they say should be interned." Nearly 1,500 Hawaii Japanese were interned during the course of the war.

Along with the Japanese consular agents, Buddhist and Shinto priests, Japanese language school officials, community and business leaders. Japanese fishermen who operated sampans around the islands were suspected. Hearing boards were established after awhile to justify the act of detainment. Gwenfread Allen, in her book Hawaii's War Years, 1941-1945, quotes portions of the suggested board procedure which was furnished by the assistant provost marshall's office.

It is desired that the hearing be confined to the pertinent issues involved in the internment, and cover the three subjects contained in the War Department Directive, i.e., CITIZENSHIP, LOYALTY and the INTERNEE'S ACTIVITIES . . . Character witnesses are of no value in a hearing of this type . . . The question of the internee’s character is not particularly pertinent to these hearings . . .

Keep in mind that these hearings are informal; that the internee is not heard as a matter of his rights and that it is desired that these records be expedited . . . Advise defendants that they may testify in their own behalf and that they may have counsel* and that they may call witnesses, all at their own expense . . . Advise attorneys if they start an argument, it will not be allowed before the Board . . .

*In a court document, one internee who sued for a writ of habeas corpus said that he was was that legal aid was "neither necessary nor desirable."

Harsh anti-Japanese sentiments and wartime hysteria provoked a general order that put new freeze control regulations on all Japanese in the territory. Many alien-owned assets were placed under federal custody, and travel, residence, occupation, alcohol consumption, businesses, and transactions were restricted. Foreign language radio broadcasts were discontinued, items like short-wave radios, firearms and cameras were confiscated, and publication of Japanese newspapers were temporarily suspended. The Japanese were ordered to keep the peace, obey all laws and regulations and refrain from active hostilities.

The strained and tense circumstances motivated many of the local leaders to press for racial unity and advise the Japanese to manifest more American ideals. By General Order No. 56, a Morale Section of the Office of the Military Governor was established in January 1942 to deal with all matters involving public morale. Racial subcommittees were formed on each island, beginning in February 1942, with a Japanese group known as the Emergency Service Committee. The Kauai Morale Committee with a central committee of Japanese residents followed in May of 1942, the Maui Emergency Committee in August, the Lanai Emergency Service Committee in January of 1943 and the Hawaii AJA Morale Committee in April of 1944. In June 1944, these groups merged to form a Territorial Emergency Service Committee, that was active until September 1945. The ideology behind the morale work was basically Americanization, as exemplified in the purpose stated in the Kauai Morale Committee's final report: "The purpose in forming this organization was initially to provide a means of participation in the war effort by the residents of Japanese ancestry, thus preventing the formation of dissident racial groups, shunned by other elements of the community and thereby rendered susceptible to subversive influence by a minority within the group. It was also planned to use this organization in educational efforts toward Americanization, dissemination of propaganda, liaison between this group and the military forces, and promotion of the sale of War Bonds and donations to other worthy causes."

Basically, the committee hoped to "reestablish confidence in the Japanese population as desirable individuals and citizens of the Island community and to guide and inspire the Japanese populace for all-out American victory and the practice of the American way of life."

The process of morale building seemed essentially to be a mainstreaming, perhaps even whitewashing, induction that severed many Japanese cultural ties and attempted to instill American patriotism in each heart and mind. On Kauai, the activities the committee undertook to promote "morale" included the Keawe Corps, a labor battalion of Japanese civilian volunteers that cut and chopped keawe trees along the shoreline for "field of fire;" an educational campaign emphasizing American victory and acceptance of the American way of life that was executed through lectures delivered by the military intelligence and the committee's central staff; mothers' and girls' forums that focused on social and sex problems, social behavior and the "upholding of the American standard of womanhood;" the establishment of English classes for aliens; the channeling of contributions made by Japanese to worthy causes, including the purchases of war bonds and the donations of blood; internees' welfare; distribution of Army posters; service flag rallies; veterans' assistance; liquidation of the Japanese language institutions and organizations; and voluntary enlistment in the U.S. armed forces.

The desire to prove one's loyalty consumed every aspect of the morale committee. In its report, it stated, "We must guide and help each other off the fence and be 100 percent for American victory. We must keep our records clean. We must refrain from acts which may bring misunderstandings. We must not wear kimonos, talk Japanese in the presence of other racial groups, violate military orders, etc. "The test of loyalty was in how much one tried; for example, taking English classes, eating with a fork and knife, and buying war bonds. The ultimate display of loyalty was making sacrifices, being willing to give one's life if necessary for America. "The only measure of true patriotism is whether we will be willing to pay the supreme price."

Subsequent to the attack on December 7, the U.S. War Department refused to allow Japanese Americans in the armed forces. Those who were already serving in the National Guard were withdrawn and the privilege of enlistment was denied to all Japanese Americans. Angus Taylor seemed to illustrate the military's attitude at this time in his testimony at the Roberts Commission proceedings when he stated, "I think that one of the biggest mistakes we could ever make is to have men out there in a position where they could do harm to us, and you see these vital projects being guarded and you wonder whether we have been invaded when you look at them; it is strictly Japanese around the installations around here, guarding those posts. I personally am bitterly opposed to that, and would put them in a work battalion and put them out somewhere, out where they could do no damage, except dig a little bit if you want them to dig."

Feeling rejected and discriminated against, local individuals circulated petitions collecting names of those Japanese Americans who desired to serve. After a great deal of persistence, a group known as the VVV's, Varsity Victory Volunteers, were allowed to serve as an auxiliary labor force to the Army engineers. The VVV's constructed and repaired military installments, roads, sewage and water systems. In June 1942, the de-activated National Guardsmen were re-organized for active combat duty as the 100th Battalion. A reserve unit was needed for this force, so in February, 1943, the Army began inducting volunteers for a special combat team which was to be composed entirely of American citizens of Japanese ancestry. In its seven major campaigns in Italy and France, the 442nd Regimental Combat Team received seven Presidential Distinguished Unit Citations and suffered 9,486 casualties. Together, the 442nd and the 100th earned 18,143 individual decorations. While placing the Presidential Unit Banner onto the colors of the 442nd, President Harry Truman stated, "I think Americanism is not a matter of race or creed, but of the heart. You fought, not only the enemy, but prejudice - and you won."

For some of those persons who were simply victims, by race, of the smoke that rose from Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, patriotism drove a hard bargain. Can there be a point at which patriotism becomes a "menace to liberty" and even denies its own premise?